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In coin tossing two remote participants want to share a
uniformly distributed random bit. At the least in the quan-
tum version, each participant test whether or not the other
has attempted to create a bias on this bit. It is requested that,
for b = 0, 1, the probability that Alice gets bit b and pass the
test is smaller than 1/2 whatever she does, and similarly for
Bob. If the bound 1/2 holds perfectly against any of the two
participants, the task realised is called an exact coin tossing.
If the bound is actually 1/2+ξ where the bias ξ vanishes when
a security parameter m defined by the protocol increases, the
task realised is a (non exact) coin tossing. It is found here
that exact coin tossing is impossible. At the same time, an
unconditionally secure quantum protocol that realises a (non
exact) coin tossing is proposed. The protocol executes m
biased quantum coin tossing procedures at the same time. It
executes the first round in each of these m procedures se-
quentially, then the second rounds are executed, and so on
until the end of the n procedures. Each procedure requires
4n particles where n ∈ O(lgm). The final bit x is the parity
of them random bits. The information about each of these m
bits is announced a little bit at a time which implies that the
principle used against bit commitment does not apply. The
bias on x is smaller than 1/m. The result is discussed in the
light of the impossibility result for exact coin tossing.
03.67.Dd,03.65.Bz,89.70.+c
a. Introduction. We propose a quantum protocol
which does for two remote participants what tossing a
fair coin does for two nearby participants. The paper is
organised in such a way that it is possible to only read
the protocol. Not so many tasks are known which can be
realised with quantum protocols. The difficulty became
apparent after the discovery that an unconditionally se-
cure quantum bit commitment was impossible [1]. This
impossibility result was a severe draw back for quantum
cryptography because quantum bit commitment was a
basic primitive for many proposed applications in cryp-
tography. For more details about the result and differ-
ent attempts to realize quantum bit commitments see [4].
However, that was not the end of quantum cryptography.
The unconditional security of a quantum key distribution
protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [5]
was obtained in 1996 [6], and as the year passed other
proofs for different quantum key distribution protocols
were obtained that corroborated the result (see [7,8] and
reference therein). These results established a variety of
tools and proposals much needed to analyse, not only the
security, but also the efficiency of quantum key distribu-
tion.
Beside key distribution, an unconditionnally secure
quantum protocol [9] for a task called secret shar-
ing [10,11] was proposed. Unconditionally secure clas-
sical protocols [12] were already known for this task, but
the recently proposed quantum protocol [9] required less
ressources. Also, secret sharing of classical information
was recently extended to secret sharing of quantum in-
formation (see [13] and reference therein). Finally, a task
called quantum gambling was also obtained [14]. To our
knowledge, that represents the known accomplishment of
unconditional quantum cryptography besides quantum
key distribution (and its immediate applications).
Our result may sound surprising since after the im-
possibility of bit commitment was shown [1], the natural
reaction was to verify whether or not the same kind of
limitiation holds for quantum coin tossing (which was
known to be a weaker two-party primitive). In fact, re-
sults were found suggesting that QTC was maybe also
impossible [17]. Only weaker quantum primitives like
quantum gambling [14] have been proposed for achiev-
ing non-trivial unconditional security in the two-party
model.
In this paper, we will carefully discuss the security
criteria for (non ideal) coin tossing and the ideal coin
tossing task of Lo and Chau. A coin tossing protocol
is exact when the criteria that define the task hold ex-
actly no matter what the cheater does. In our point of
view, coin tossing and ideal coin tossing are two different
tasks, and each of them has its own exact and non exact
versions [15]. We will explain why the most natural ob-
jective of quantum cryptography should be a (non ideal)
coin tossing, not an ideal (exact or non exact) coin toss-
ing. We will describe our protocol and design an attack
with a bias larger than (1/2)(m−1)3/m6 ≈ 1/(2m3). We
will explain why we believe that the bias is necessarily
smaller than 1/m in general. To further analyse the pro-
tocol, we will define a general attack against exact coin
tossing, a larger class than exact ideal coin tossing [16].
This general attack is very instructive because it often ap-
plies to protocol even when the objective is weaker than
exact coin tossing. This general attack defeats many pro-
posed coin tossing. It will guide us to distinguish between
what is possible and what is not. This analysis will sug-
gest that a coin tossing protocol with an exponentially
small bias is possible.
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b. Security criteria. In a na¨ıve view point, a coin
tossing protocol is secure against a given participant if,
whatever this participant does, the other participant re-
ceives a uniformly distributed random bit. The two bits
must be identical only when both participants are hon-
est. As we will see, this na¨ıve definition of coin tossing
is too strong to have any practical value, even in a non
exact case where some bias is accepted. This definition
does not take into account that at some point the par-
ticipants will have to indicate whether or not they agree
on the bit. For example, if the game is that the looser
must pay one coin to the winner, a participant must im-
plicitly announce his decision by accepting or refusing to
pay the coin. More convincingly, the standard way to
execute coin tossing on top of bit commitment does not
respect this security criteria. To realise coin tossing on
top of bit commitment, Alice commits a uniformly dis-
tributed random bit to Bob, Bob announces a uniformly
distributed random bit to Alice, and finally Alice opens
her bit. The final bit is the xor of the two bits. In order
to defeat the protocol Alice simply does not open her bit.
The protocol fails (in accordance with this na¨ıve criteria)
because Alice has the power to abort the protocol.
A realistic security criteria for coin tossing must accept
the fact that a protocol can abort. An example is when
Alice refuses to open the bit. The non acceptation to pay
a coin is another example, but formally these payments
are not part of the coin tossing task. To include this no-
tion of disagreement in the task, it is requested that each
participant outputs either the value “abort” or “accept”
at the end. An honest participant should use the value
“abort” only if he detects that the other participant has
cheated or fails to collaborate. Using the value “abort”
at other time is dishonest. Note that no secure coin toss-
ing protocol would exist if a protocol could be declared
insecure only because a dishonest participant can adopt
this abort strategy. Despite the fact that this strategy
does influence the outcome, it is accepted in accordance
with the coin tossing security criteria that such a cheat-
ing strategy does not defeat the protocol because there
is nothing we can do about it. If we don’t accept this
principle, even the standard coin tossing protocol that
is built on top of a perfect bit commitment is insecure
which will contradict one of the most standard reduction
in cryptography.
Let pb, b = 0, 1, be the probability that (1) the protocol
does not abort and (2) the random bit is b. For every
fixed strategy, these probabilities are well defined. By
definition, p0 + p1 is the probability that the protocol
does not abort. Of course, what happens with the bit
b when the protocol aborts can be ignored because this
bit will not be used. If both participants are honest, we
must have p0 = p1 = 1/2. We say that the protocol
is correct. A coin tossing protocol is secure against a
participant (say Alice) if (1) it is correct and (2), for
every strategy adopted by Alice, the probabilities p0, p1
which are generated by the protocol can also be generated
by a strategy that simply aborts a secure non biased coin
tossing in view of the bit obtained. It is not hard to see
that this criteria is equivalent to p0, p1 ≤ 1/2 for every
strategy and p0 = p1 = 1/2 when both participants are
honest. In the non exact case, we should accept p0, p1 ≤
1/2 + ξ where ξ > 0 is a small bias which vanishes as a
security parameter m increases. We will also accept an
exponentially small probability that the protocol aborts
when the participants are honest.
By definition [17], an ideal coin tossing is a coin toss-
ing with the additional constraint p0 = p1. It is not
hard to see that such a constraint is not respected by the
standard coin tossing protocol built on top of bit com-
mitment. Alice has only to refuse to open the bit every
time the game result is 1. The effect is that p0 = 1/2 and
p1 = 0. In the non exact case, we accept |p0 − p1| ≤ ξ,
where ξ can be arbitrarily small, but even then the stan-
dard reduction of coin tossing to bit commitment does
not respect this ideal criteria. Therefore, unless we ex-
pect to do better than this standard coin tossing protocol,
ideal coin tossing (exact or non exact) is not a natural
objective for quantum cryptography. Our protocol is a
non exact coin tossing protocol, not a non exact ideal
coin tossing.
The protocol. Let ψ(0) = c|0〉+ s|1〉 and ψ(1) = c|0〉−
s|1〉, where c, s are are real numbers such that the angle
between the two state is θ. The angle θ is a parameter
in the protocol which should be optimised. We propose
θ = pi/9. Let us define Φ(0) = ⊗nk=1ψ(0) and Φ(1) =
⊗nk=1ψ(1). The angle Θ between Φ(0) and Φ(1) is given
by cos(Θ) = cosn(θ). Note that (pi/2−Θ) is exponentially
small. Let (E0, E
⊥
0 ) and (E1, E
⊥
1 ) be the POVMs on
the 2n dimensional space for the n particles defined via
E0 = |Φ(0)〉〈Φ(0)|, E1 = |Φ(1)〉〈Φ(1)|, E⊥0 = 1−E0 and
E⊥1 = 1−E1. The outcomes associated with E0 and E1
are respectively 0 and 1, whereas the outcomes associated
with E⊥0 and E
⊥
1 are denoted ⊥ in both cases (we don’t
need to distinguish these two cases). For a ∈ {0, 1,⊥},
we adopt the convention a⊕⊥ = ⊥. In the protocol the
standard ordering of the nested loops “For i = 1 . . . n do:
For j = 1 . . .m do:” must be respected, especially at step
3.
Step 1- For j = 1 . . .m do: Alice uniformly picks at
random a bit aj and Bob uniformly picks at random a bit
bj. The final bit will be the xor of all bits xj = (aj ⊕ bj).
Step 2- For i = 1, ..., n do: For j = 1, ...,m do: Alice
uniformly picks a random bit cij and sends a pair of par-
ticles in the state ψ(cij)⊗ ψ(c¯ij); Bob uniformly picks a
random bit dij and sends a pair of particles in the prod-
uct state ψ(dij) ⊗ ψ(d¯ij). At this stage no information
at all about the bits aj and bj is unveiled.
Step 3- For i = 1, ..., n do: For j = 1, ...,m do: Alice
announces eij = aj ⊕ cij and Bob returns the second
particle at position (i, j) if eij = 0 and the first particle
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otherwise; Bob announces fij = bj⊕dij and Alice returns
the second particle at position (i, j) if fij = 0 and the
first particle otherwise. At this stage, for every j, the n
particles sent by Alice and not returned by Bob are in
the state Φ(aj) and the n particles sent by Bob and not
returned by Alice are in the state Φ(bj). Similarly, for
every j, the n particles returned by Bob are in the state
Φ(a¯j), whereas the n particles returned by Alice are in
the state Φ(b¯j).
Step 4- For j = 1 . . .m do: Alice announces aj , Bob
executes the POVM (Eaj , E
⊥
aj ) on Φ(aj), notes the out-
come a˜j and if a˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts; Alice executes
the POVM (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) on Φ(bj), notes the outcome b˜j and
if b˜j = ⊥ the protocol aborts.
Step 5- For j = 1 . . .m do: Alice measures the state
Φ(a¯j) returned by Bob at position j with the POVM
(Ea¯j , E
⊥
a¯j ) and if the outcome is ⊥ the protocol aborts;
Bob measures the state φ(b¯j) returned by Alice at posi-
tion j with the POVM (Eb¯j , E
⊥
b¯j
) and if the outcome is
⊥ the protocol aborts.
Alice’s final bit is A ⊕ B˜ where A = ⊕jaj and B˜ =
⊕j b˜j. Bob’s final bit is A˜ ⊕ B where A˜ = ⊕ja˜j and
B = ⊕jbj .
To explain how this protocol works, let us consider
the procedure obtained if every loop statement “For
j = 1 . . .m do:” in the protocol is only executed for a
fixed value of j, and the other values of j are ignored.
The restricted protocol becomes a biased coin tossing
procedure BiasedCoin(aj, bj) which returns the random
bit xj = aj ⊕ bj . The complete protocol can be de-
scribed in terms of the procedure BiasedCoin in the fol-
lowing way. Alice and Bob execute the first round of
BiasedCoin for j = 1, . . . ,m, then the second round of
BiasedCoin for j = 1, . . . ,m, and so on until the last
round. They do not wait until after the end of the pro-
cedure BiasedCoin(aj, bj) before starting the procedure
BiasedCoin(aj+1, bj+1). This is very important, because
otherwise the protocol would be ruled out by a theorem
of Santha and Vazirani [18] which states that one cannot
make a less biased coin tossing protocol on top of a biased
coin tossing if the biased coin tossing is used sequentially.
The basic idea in BiasedCoin is that at the same rate
Alice and Bob progressively provide information at step 3
about their respective bits aj and bj . Alice can influence
the xor aj ⊕ bj as much as she has information about
bj . For example, at the beginning of step 3 she knows
nothing about bj , and therefore her first request cannot
influence at all the bit aj⊕bj . At the time where she has
more information about bj , she has already committed
herself to a large degree to the bit aj . Therefore, Alice
cannot entirely control the bit aj ⊕ bj . The samething is
true for Bob.
Note that it is important that Alice and Bob send par-
ticles at step 2 which they ask back at step 3. In a pre-
vious version of the protocol, Alice and Bob sent their
respective states ψ(aj) and ψ(bj) directly at step 2, not
pairs of states. The situation that was obtained in this
previous version after step 2 is the one that we have here
in the protocol after step 3. Steps 3 and 5 were not used.
An attack completely defeated this previous version. The
attack was simple, but easy to miss! When Bob receives
ψ(aj) he sends back the state to Alice in replacement of
the state ψ(bj). From Alice’s view point, his behavior is
exactly as if bj = aj . At the end, Alice announces aj
first, and then Bob announces bj = aj to pass the test.
(To hide his strategy, Bob can change the order of the po-
sitions j when he returns the particles.) This attack does
not apply to our protocol anymore. Bob cannot transfer
quantum information from a particle coming from the a
side to another one that he will send on the b˜ side at
step 2 and be ready to return the original particle on the
a side at step 3 without creating any disturbance. This
situation remind us of Eve’s dilemma in a quantum key
distribution protocol.
c. A conjectured optimal attack. Here we describe
what we believe is, modulo some fine tunings, an optimal
attack against the protocol. We can assume that Bob
is the cheater because he has more power than Alice.
Clearly, if the states sent (and not asked back) by Bob
are independent of the aj , the protocol is not defeated.
To defeat the protocol, Bob must transfer information
from the bits aj to the outcomes b˜j . Without loss of
generality, we assume that Bob wants a bias toward 0.
For every j, Bob receives 2n particles. However, Bob
will only interact with the n particles which he does not
have to return. The intuition is that extra information
is only useful if it is obtained for every j, which implies
that the probability of failing the test will be very large,
even before a small bias could be created. Also, Bob
will be honest on what he sends to Alice for every j =
1 . . .m − 1, and only try to influence the bit b˜m. The
intuition is that changing the single bit b˜m is sufficient
to change the parity B˜, and, for every i, Bob has more
information when j = m. Let B[m−1] = ⊕m−1j=1 bj, and
recall A = ⊕jaj. Clearly, Bob’s optimal strategy is to
always announce bˆm
def
= A ⊕ B[m−1] at the end, even if
in doing so his probability to pass the test is very small.
The following formulas are useful. Consider a uni-
formly distributed random bit a coded into a state ψa,
and let Ω be the angle between ψ0 and ψ1. We have that
the probability of error with the best POVM to guess a
is
PE = sin2(pi/4 − Ω/2) = (1/2)[1− sin(Ω)].
The probability of determining conclusively the value of
a with the best POVM for that purpose is
PC = 1− cos(Ω).
Note that if one obtains a conclusive outcome with
probalility PC, then he can guess bit a with probabil-
ity (1 − PC)/2 which must not be smaller than PE by
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definition of PE (and this inequality can easily be ver-
ified). If Bob has sent the state ψ0 and he announces
that he has sent the state ψ1 his probability of passing
the best test to verify his announcement is
PS = cos2(Ω).
In the appendix, we show that if m bits a1 . . . am are
coded into a product state ψa1 . . . ψam , the probability of
error in the best POVM to guess the parity bit A = ⊕jaj
is (exactly)
PE(m) = (1/2)[1− sinm(Ω)].
We obtain that the probability of a conclusive outcome
on the parity bit is bounded above by
PC(m) = sinm(Ω).
Here is the attack. At the beginning Bob will be honest
for every j = 1 . . .m, until i = ⌈lgc((m− 1)/m2)⌉ where
c = cos(θ). At this stage, he has received i particles from
Alice for every j, but he has not yet sent the ith particle
to Alice at position j = m. This value of i is chosen so
that cos(Ωi) = cos(θ)
i ≤ (m − 1)/m2 and cos(Ωi−1) =
cos(θ)i−1 ≥ (m − 1)/m2. He executes the measurement
on the states Φ(aj) that maximises the probability of
a conclusive outcome for each aj . He will obtain the
value of bˆm with a probability PC greater than 1/m. If
bˆm = bm, then he continues honestly which means that
the final bit will be 0, otherwise he swap the value of bm
used in his preparation, and he will pass the test with
probability PS greater than (m−1)2/m4. The probabil-
ity of 0 is 1/2(1+PC×PS). The bias will be larger than
(1/2)(m − 1)3/m6 ∈ O(1/m3). The bias in this con-
jectured optimal attack is smaller than 1/m because, for
0 ≤ c = cos(θ) ≤ 1, (1/2)× PC × PS = (1/2)cm[1− c2]
is neccessarily smaller than [m/(m+2)]m/2[1/(m+2)] ≤
1/m.
d. A general attack against exact coin tossing. The
general attack that we propose is an adaptation of the
general attack against bit commitment [1]. Understand-
ing this attack will help us to analyse the protocol fur-
ther. Note that exact coin tossing is a larger class than
exact ideal coin tossing [15,16]. To determine the at-
tack we must first know who can apply the attack. At
any given round in the honest protocol, before a partici-
pant sends information, he can try to find out whether or
not he has the power to guess perfectly the game result.
Conceptually, we can think that a measurement provides
this information by returning the outcome “can” or “can-
not”. By definition, the result “can” means that subse-
quently the participant can make another measurement
with two outcomes 0 and 1 such that the associated col-
lapsed states Ψ0 and Ψ1 guarantee that the final game
result is 0 and 1 respectively. For every participant, there
exists neccessarily a step together with a measurement
that returns the outcome “can” with probability 1 at that
step (we include this constraint in the definition of ex-
act). At previous steps, with a probability smaller than 1
the participant might have received sufficient information
to guess perfectly the game result, that is, the outcome
“can” might occur with some probability smaller than 1
at previous steps. We do not consider these steps. We
only consider steps at which a participant can systemat-
ically guess the game result. Without loss of generality
let us assume that Bob is the first to reach such a step.
Let Ψ0 and Ψ1 be the collapsed states associated with
the result 0 and 1 obtained by Bob at this step. At
this step, the fidelity between the two density matrices
on Alice’s side associated with Ψ0 and Ψ1 respectively is
neccessarily greater than 0. Otherwise, Alice has reached
before Bob a step at which she can systematically find
out the game result, which is a contradiction.
To execute the attack Bob first executes the honest
protocol at the quantum level (see [4] for more details)
until after he reaches the step that is described above.
At the end of the protocol, the three outcomes 0, 1 and
abort on Alice’s side correspond formally to the outcomes
of some measurement. We know that in the honest pro-
tocol Φ1 leads to 1 with certainty and Φ0 leads to 0 with
certainty. Being honest, Bob gets Φ0 and Φ1 with prob-
ability 1/2 each. When he gets Φ1 he continues honestly
and Alice obtains 1. So, we have that p1 is at least 1/2.
When he gets Φ0, he moves a little bit toward Φ1 as in
the attack against quantum bit commitment [1,2]. This
implies that p1 is now larger than 1/2 and therefore the
protocol is not an exact coin tossing.
We have to make sure when we design a coin toss-
ing protocol that it is not ruled out by the above attack
which is likely to apply even if the objective is weaker
than exact coin tossing. This guideline is very useful. To
illustrate this point we describe a na¨ıve (non exact) coin
tossing protocol. This na¨ıve protocol can be defeated by
Bob using this general attack against exact coin-tossing,
despite the fact that the protocol does not intend to real-
ize exact coin-tossing. The usual rectilinear and diagonal
bases are denoted + and × respectively. The states of
the rectilinear basis are denoted |0〉 and |1〉. The di-
agonal basis is given by |0〉× = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 + |1〉) and
|1〉× = (1/
√
2)(|0〉 − |1〉).
A na¨ıve protocol. Step 1: Alice prepares m states
Φj = (1/
√
2)[|00〉+ |11〉] and sends the second photon in
each state to Bob. Step 2: For each position j = 1, . . . ,m,
Bob picks at random one of the basis + or ×, sends the
basis to Alice and measures his photon in that basis. Step
3: Alice measures her photons in the bases announced
by Bob and anounces the m bits returned. For both
participants, the final bit is the xor of the m outcomes
(s)he obtains on his side. The test: Bob verifies that the
m bits announced by Alice are correct.
To apply the general attack on this na¨ıve protocol Bob
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must locate the step in the honest protocol at which with
probability one he can learn completely the game result.
In the na¨ıve protocol Bob can learn the game result when
he chooses the bases. We have a big problem because at
this step Alice can obtain almost no information at all
about the game result (because she doesn’t know the
bases). We must conclude that Bob can pass from 0 to 1
with probability almost 1. In practice, Bob simply learns
the bit by being honest, and then, if he looses, he swap
a few bases in the announcement to randomize the game
result again. In this way, he creates an additional bias.
To almost completely defeat the protocol, Bob will have
to use the principle explained in [4], that is, he will have
to keep all his computation at the quantum level until
he learns the bit returned by the honest protocol. Here,
it means that the bases will be kept in superposition in
quantum registers, the measurements will be executed
using the computer and their outcomes also kept in quan-
tum registers, etc. Nothing should be classical except the
game result. Then, if he doesn’t get the bit he wants, he
can swap to this bit with probability almost 1.
We learned from the analysis of this attack that we
must guarantee that at the time a participant can learn
the game result, the other participant must also have
received a large amount of information about the game
result. If that is the case, then this attack will only allow
the cheater to create a small additional bias.
Now we applied this attack to our protocol. Bob will
learn the game result first when Alice will announce bit
am. At that time, Bob will know every thing, but he
will not have yet announced his bit bm. He can move the
bit toward 1 only if he can swap bm. As a first approxi-
mation, we can ignore the perhaps more efficient version
of the attack in which Bob keeps bm in superposition as
a control qbit. Every classical value will be announced
in the honest protocol, except bm but even bm will be
almost totally announced. Even if bm was initially in a
quantum superposition, at the moment of swapping bm,
the qbit will be (except with an exponentially small bias)
indistinguishable from a classical mixture. Bob’s prob-
lem is that after having sent n informative states about
bm, his probability to pass the test if he swaps bm is ex-
ponentially small in n.
In this attack, Bob could not use the fact that he knows
completely the aj just before swapping bm because Al-
ice’s test essentially fixed the value of bm (and the other
bj were totally fixed). To avoid this difficulty, Bob must
swap the game result before he has sent too much infor-
mation about the bits bm and thus increase his probabil-
ity to pass the test. This is exactly what Bob does by
using conclusive measurements to determine A as soon
as possible with a probability PC > 1/m. The problem
with the best guess measurements is the following. If
Bob uses the best guess measurement for bˆm, the final
bit 0 will be obtained when (1) the guess is correct and
bˆm = bm or (2) the guess is correct, bˆm 6= bm and the test
(Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) performed by Alice is successful. These two
cases occur with total probability 1/2(1− PE)(1 + PS)
where PE is the probability of error in the guess and PS
is the probability of passing the test (Ebj , E
⊥
bj
) performed
by Alice is successful.
Let PE(1) be the probability of error while guessing a
single bit aj . Bob’s probability to fail the test 1−PS will
be about the same as his probability 1− PE(1) to guess
correctly any bit aj . The probability (1 − PE) to guess
correctly the parity of the bits aj will be approximatively
(1 − PE(1))m ≈ 1 − mPE(1) (and this is true even if
coherent measurements can be used to obtain the best
guess on the parity bit). Therefore, (1/2)(1 − PE)(1 +
PS) < 1/2, and the strategy is useless.
Of course, with probability PE/2 Bob will have
swapped bm which was originally bˆm and at a subsequent
value of i Bob might want to swap the value of bm back
to his orginal value. Similarly, with probability PE/2
Bob will have kept bm 6= bˆm and at a subsequent value
of i he might want to swap it to the value bm. How-
ever, the probability of error in these subsequent guess
will be about the same, so that a factor (1 − PE) will
appear again. A strategy with a conclusive outcome is
much better because PE = 0 and the probability of 0 is
1/2(1 + PC × PS).
The above analysis suggests that a better protocol
could be obtained if conclusive measurements were im-
possible such as is the case when the bits a(j) are coded
in density matrices. Work is in progress in this direc-
tion and there are indications that an exponentially small
bias is possible. We recall that it is important that the
information is unveiled progressively. One might think
that if only a polynomial number of rounds are used,
then the rate at which the information will be unveiled
cannot allow an exponentially small bias. However, this
requirement is only important at the end. The informa-
tion can be unveiled in such a way that, for every j, first
1/2 bit is unveiled, then 3/4 bit is unveiled, then 7/8 bit
is unveiled, and so on. This requires only a polynomial
number of rounds.
Our protocol is not an exact coin tossing, so it does not
defy the impossibility result for exact coin tossing. How-
ever, without a careful design of the protocol, this attack
would have applied to our coin tossing protocol. Our
result corroborate a conjecture proposed by Mayers [1]
stating that the symmetric protocol might be possible
whereas the non symmetric tasks, such as one sided se-
cure computations, would be impossible. For example,
it will be interesting to find a quantum protocol for the
identification task in which Alice (a user) and Bob (a
bank) both want to check if they have the same personal
identification number (PIN) associated with a particular
account, but do not want to unveil their secret PIN in
the process. This is also a symmetric task.
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APPENDIX A: MINIMAL ERROR
PROBABILITY FOR THE PARITY BIT.
This appendix is about the difficulty of finding the par-
ity bit in quantum cryptography. It completes some work
did by Bennett, Mor and Smolin in 1996 [19].
The setting is the following. Consider two states ψ(0)
and ψ(1) at an angle Ω. We have m bits a1 . . . am en-
coded by Alice into the product state ψ(a1) . . . ψ(am)
which is sent to Bob. Bob wants to obtain a guess A∗
on A = ⊕jaj so that PE(m) = Pr(A∗ 6= A) is mini-
mal. We evaluate exactly the minimum of PE(m) over
all possible POVM. Next, we use it to easily bound the
probability of obtaining a conclusive outcome PC(m) us-
ing PC(m) ≤ 1 − 2PE(m), which comes from the fact
that if you obtain a conclusive outcome with probability
PC(m) you will guess the parity bit with probability of
error (1−PC(m))/2, which by definition must be larger
than PE(m). It is easy to determine the POVM that
minimises the probability and to actually compute ex-
actly PE(m) = Pr(A∗ 6= A) for that POVM.
We only do the case where m is odd. The case where
m is even is similar. The states ψ(0) and ψ(1) are conve-
niently written ψ(0) = c|0〉+ s|1〉 and ψ(1) = c|0〉− s|1〉,
where c = cos(Ω/2) and s = sin(Ω/2). The two density
matrices for the parity A = 0 and A = 1 respectively
are block diagonal (every block is a 2x2 matrix). If we
reorganise the order of rows and collums properly, for
k = 0, ...., (m− 1)/2, there are (mk ) blocks like this one:(
c2(m−k)s2k ±cmsm
±cmsm c2ks2(m−k)
)
The plus sign is for A = 0 and the negative sign for
A = 1. In particular, one can easily check that
(m−1)/2∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
[c2(m−k)s2k + c2ks2(m−k)] = 1.
Therefore, in both cases, for the best guess or to max-
imise the probability of a conclusive outcome, the best
strategy is to first find out in which block we have ob-
tained, and then try to find out the parity given that
we have obtained that block. Given that we have one of
these blocks the task is easy because every block has the
shape
(
a2 ±ab
±ab b2
)
which corresponds to the pure states φ± = a|0〉 ± b|1〉,
where a = cos(Θk/2) and b = sin(Θk/2). The angle Θk
is the angle between the two states φ+ and φ−.
Given that we have one of these blocks, the best guess
has probability of error PE = sin2(pi/4 − Θk/2). One
obtains PE = (1/2)[b− a]2 = (1/2)[1− 2ab] = 1/2− ab.
Let pk be the trace of the block of type k, which cor-
responds to the probability of each block of this type.
We have that ab = (cmsm)/pk. Using this simple obser-
vation, one obtains that the average probability of error
over the blocks is
PE(m) =
(m−1)/2∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
pk[1/2− (cmsm)/pk]
= (1/2)[1− (2cs)m].
Therefore, we have obtaines PE(m) = (1/2)[1−sinm(Ω)].
Finally, we obtain PC(m) ≤ sinm(Ω). Note that
PC(1) = 1− cos(Ω), and we have 1− cos(Ω) ≤ sin(Ω) by
the triangle inequality.
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